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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GORDON LEE WALLS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030139-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
to murder, a first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the "pour-over" 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Should this Court reach defendant's claims that his plea was taken in 
violation of rule 11 where defendant did not raise those claims in his 
motion to withdraw before the trial court?1 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
defendant raises a rule 11 claim challenging his competency in Point I of his 
brief. He raises a rule 11 claim challenging the value of the State's promise in Point II of 
his brief. To avoid repetition, the State addresses both these claims in Point I of its brief. 
Also, although defendant in Point I arguably does not present a constitutional 
claim challenging his competency that is distinguishable from his rule 11 claim, 
defendant does cite to due process and constitutional law to support his overall argument. 
The State therefore treats defendant's competency argument as raising both a rule 11 
(addressed in Point I of the State's brief) and a constitutional claim (addressed in Point II 
of the State's brief). 
II. Should this Court reach defendant's constitutional claim that he was 
incompetent to plead guilty where defendant fails to marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial court's competency finding? 
This Court "'review[s] a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
under an "abuse of discretion" standard, incorporating the "clearly erroneous" standard 
for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision.'" State v. 
Visser, 2001 UT App 215, f 7, 31 P.3d 584 (quoting State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 
(Utah 1996)), cert, denied, 40 P.3d 1135 (Utah 2001). "The determination of whether a 
defendant is competent to proceed . . . is a mixed question of fact and law." State v. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Utah 1997). However, "[t]he trial court's factual 
findings in support of its determination of malingering and its accompanying credibility 
determinations are subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999) and Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
are relevant to this appeal and are reproduced at Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE and STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The crime? In the afternoon of June 11, 2001, defendant's mother, Mary Scott, 
was watching her soap operas when an old friend, Jake Roberts, came by with a bottle of 
whiskey (R. 185:43). Mary and Jake were drinking and talking when Mary's live-in 
boyfriend, Craig Tillet, entered the living room from their apartment's only bedroom (R. 
2Because no trial was held in this case, the facts of the crime are taken from the 
preliminary hearing transcript and defendant's plea hearing. 
2 
185:44, 46). Within a short while, Craig got mad at Mary and started calling her names 
and "slimeballing" her (R. 185:44, 52). Jake then offered Mary some marijuana, and the 
two of them smoked some (R. 185:44). Mary soon fell asleep on the living room couch 
(R. 185:45). 
A short while later, Mary was awakened by noise from the bedroom where 
defendant and Craig were arguing and threatening each other (R. 185:45-46). Mary, who 
had previously had trouble with defendant, told them to stop arguing or she was going to 
call the police (R. 185:46, 48, 53). 
Shortly thereafter, defendant came into the living room yelling and throwing things 
(R. 185:47). After briefly stopping at the bathroom, defendant then ran out the back door 
(R. 185:46, 48). Mary went back to sleep (R. 184:47). 
Mary was later awakened by her dog, who was scratching at the bedroom door (R. 
185:47). As Mary opened the door to let the dog in, Mary noticed Craig lying on the 
floor next to the bed (R. 185:47). When Mary tried to wake Craig, she noticed blood on 
him (R. 185:47). As she continued to try to wake him, she turned his head and saw more 
blood (R. 185:48). Mary then called 911, reported that Craig was on the floor with blood 
all around him, and told the dispatcher that she thought her son did it (R. 185:18-19, 48). 
Mary explained that her son "gets real violent when he is drinking" and that he "is the 
only one who could have done this" (R. 185:22). 
Defendant was arrested later that evening (R. 185:22). In his left back pocket, 
police found Craig's wallet (R. 185:70). 
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While awaiting trial, defendant told an inmate that he and Craig had been arguing 
that night, that he had kicked Craig several times in the head, and that, although he knew 
Craig was dying, he did not call the police because he didn't want to get in trouble (R. 
185:97-98, 104-05). 
Craig died from injury to the brain secondary to a lack of oxygen to the brain (R. 
185:30). The precipitating event was multiple blunt force injuries to the head combined 
with a state of intoxication (R. 185:30-31). Craig sustained abrasions on his upper left 
forehead and an abrasion and laceration above the right eyebrow (R. 185:34). In addition, 
both the back and front of both of Craig's ears were bruised (R. 185:34). Craig also had 
bruises on the back of his head near the upper part of his neck, on both his arms, and over 
his left chest (R. 185:34). 
Once Craig's head was shaven, bruise patterns became visible (R. 185:35-36). 
Several of those patterns matched the soles of the shoes defendant was wearing when he 
was arrested (R. 185:24, 27, 36). 
The plea. On June 15, 2001, defendant was charged with murder, a first degree 
felony (R. 10-11). After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on that charge 
(R. 78). 
On March 26, 2002, defendant pleaded guilty to murder as charged (R. 99; R. 
186:2-14). As part of that plea, defendant signed a statement in support of his plea (R. 
102-08). In exchange for defendant's plea, the State agreed to send a letter to the Board 
of Pardons requesting that defendant serve between ten and twelve years of the statutory 
4 
five-years-:.- . • ' -^n-i in: "vou should also 
. .. ,
 f ibt | ) e c a u s e the State writes a letter to the parole authority doesn't mean 
t:ie} have- • (oILw their recommendation" (R 186:7). Defendant replied,'Y caii. . \e 
^een told thai • • * . , ! . . . 
.'In SI.ili Lis iikL .ifnl tlic\ iii.t' r\ in.r, r " <In in petering this sentence because you 
could serve a lot longer than what they're going to recommend" (R 186:7-8). Defendant 
responded, "Yea?" T Vnnw" fR 1 <?£-Q> Finally, before accepting c* icn^r.;; . >;; e 
following ensued: 
Court: And are you supposed to be taking any kind of drugs 
that you're not taking? 
Defendan' T-Vell, they—they're supposed to be giving me 
Thorazine, h\:t I told them I didn't w ant to take it. 
Defendant. Haldol. 
Court How- how are -how is your mental state today? Are 
you thinking clearly? 
Court: Ha\ e you understood everything I've told you toda> 
about your rights? 
Ukav And lias \\\x< llmm/int1 brcti prescribed 
In \ on hv a physician.:1 
Defendai. .•!< the iail 
Court: *-. =., ,:. 
Defendant: Yeah. 
Court: Okay. 
Defendant: So I guess it's a physician. 
Court: And for what purpose was that given? 
Defendant: I don't remember. 
Court: You don't—you're not sure? 
Defendant: (Shakes head.) 
Court: Okay. 
Defense Counsel: For the record, Your Honor, I've talked to Mr. 
Walls extensively twice over the last couple of weeks and he 
has shown that he has understood what we've talked about 
and we've engaged in reasonable discussions. He's 
understood and asked relevant questions. 
Court: Okay. And, again, have you understood everything 
today I've told you? 
Defendant: Yes. 
(R. 186:9-10). 
During the plea hearing, defendant responded appropriately to every question 
asked by the court (R. 186:2-13, 15). On multiple occasions, defendant expressly told the 
court that he understood what he was pleading to, the sentence which applied to his 
crime, and the rights he was giving up as a result of his plea (R. 186:2-8, 10). Once, after 
nodding to the judge in response to a question and being told that he had to respond out 
loud, defendant followed the court's direction, verbalizing his answer (R. 186:2-3). 
6 
•ii * plea and prior to his 
sentencing, defendant moved pro se to withdraw his plea, alleging ineffective assistance 
of counsel (R ' ** The State objected to deiei.dan= - M^iion, arguing that 
defendant liaa enicjvw ..*. , ka I iiuuiiijj) an I ilmil.n il 111 • iidu.ituu lie \\<i^  satisfied 
11 miniM^li i U I i in in I ii'ton'l'inl was subsequently appointed new counsel (R. 112). 
On August 6, 2002, a hearing was held on defendant's motion (R ! ? n Ax *u~* 
time, defense counsel indicated ihiv . :., r ne of the big issues on * ^ 
" •. - -! and vuiuntanl^ and mtclli^entK enter into the plea negotiations on this 
matter" (R. 181:6). Defense counsel then asked that the court appoint two alienists to 
j ~ * ;— whetnv,: .i^iCiiuant was compe^; 
•• ^
 r
 v iiic^t <R. l b i . 7 j . Rhcii 
l>ottci", a licensed clinical social worker, and Dr. Rick Hawks, a licensed psychologist, 
were appointed as alienists (R 179; R 183:13,29), 
I Mi hovc i i i l v t JM Jl»» " ". in I'MIU.IIV ,.»>,, ,'IMM llii;- i i i . i l ni l held addili. in il 
••!! '•• - M-*nuant's motion vR. l£>->, 184). At both hearings, defense counsel told the 
..our ih;u **ihe RI.1L- I i colloui;: ri:i connection with defendant'" pica] was done 
adequately ana. ... ;aet. even mor. \I\A-. adequutds" <u 
... . >t defendant in connection with defendant's 
plea (R. 183. iu, R. 154:45-45;. Counsel's only concern was whether defendant was 
competent at the time he entered his plea (R 184:45-48). 
7 
In his written evaluation, Rhett Potter noted that defendant was "oriented to 
person, time, place, and situation" (R. 179:Potter's Rep. at 1). Moreover, defendant 
"seemed to be of normal intelligence" and "he expressed himself adequately . . . [with] an 
adequate grasp of language" (Id.). Potter noticed "no indications of hallucinations, 
delusions, tangential thought, or loose associations," and found "no thought process 
disorders" with defendant (Id.). 
Although Potter noted that defendant claimed he was hearing voices, Potter 
concluded that defendant's symptoms were "atypical in my experience with people who 
have auditory hallucinations" (R. 179:Potter's Rep. at 2). Thus, Potter "doubt[ed] the 
veracity of [defendant's] claims," noting that "[t]hey seem to be a convenient 
explanation/excuse for [defendant's] behavior" and "are probably a manipulative device" 
used by defendant (Id.). 
Finally, Potter noted that defendant's "[r]ecent and remote memory were intact" 
and that defendant's "letters to the Court and to his defense attorney show a good grasp of 
the charges, the judicial process, and alternative defenses" (Id.). Potter then concluded 
that "there is no mental disorder to impact the nature and quality of the defendant's 
relationship with counsel" (Id. at 3). Moreover, in Potter's "professional opinion . . . , 
[defendant] was mentally competent at the time he entered his plea of guilty" (Id.). 
Consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(4)(a) (1999), Potter found that defendant was: 
i. capable to comprehend and appreciate the charges or 
allegations against him; 
ii. able to disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of 
mind; 
8 
iii. ' able to comprehend and appreciate the range ana i.ai.irj »>{ 
• possible penalties, if applicable, that mnv be ^vp<^c l m ^-
proceedings against him; 
iv. able to engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and 
options; 
v. able to understand the adversary nature of the proceedings 
against him; 
vi. able to manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; 
vii able to testify relevantly, if applicable, 
I I I ' » P n f t H s R f f i , l l ' i | . ' ' •' '' 
Potter testified before the trial court on November 20, 2002 I'R. 1S?) \i »:-:.*.: t:mt\ 
PfHte* jlarified that his evaluation was to determine ^ i,cu.^  \ aetendant was currc.:. 
rompeten . • . 
i nave conducted the same interview but may have reviewed 
the plea video ana talked v\uh defense counsel and the prosecutor (R. 183:26-27), 
Still, Potter re-iterated much vi ua, .niwrmdtU'ii ;n his repor t, • . /, 
, ,-:IL - l* •* /i, ii "seemed 
-• vva^  trackir^ ^propri.'itoh ^ jjlat {1C understood what the charges were, he 
understood the possible penalties *P *S? 1 ^ potter testified that an incompetent 
person would not tiawk \.m\ \--.... .. . * .hi (I il ildnhlaiif\ irmnir in.) nvrni 
. , . , , . * -* <>rted Potter's conclusion, although Potter noted that he 
did not do any psychological testing on defendant (R. 183:22). 
Finally, Potter'reiterated that although voices and schizophren..L • : 
v Hallucination^ work vV i LA l t i person v. no has schizophrenia \R IS3 2'M 
9 
Moreover, Potter found no diagnosis of schizophrenia in any of the prior treatment 
programs in which defendant had been involved for alcohol abuse (R. 183:25). 
Furthermore, even if defendant was suffering from some kind of schizophrenia, that did 
not mean he could not competently enter a plea (R. 183:21). Indeed, if defendant suffered 
from schizophrenia to the extent that he required medication and, as was the case here, 
defendant was not taking his medication at the time of his plea, the judge would "have 
some question about whether or not this person was actually able to make that plea or 
not"(R. 183:28). 
Dr. Hawks prepared two reports evaluating defendant. The initial report was 
prepared on October 10, 2002 (R. 179:Hawks' 1st Rep. at 3). The second report, 
prepared after more investigation and monitoring, was prepared on January 6, 2003 (R. 
179:Hawks' 2nd Rep. at 3). 
In his first report, Hawks stated that defendant "appeared to exhibit schizophrenic-
like symptoms e.g. flat affect, mental confusion, thought blocking, etc." (R. 179:Hawks' 
1st Rep. at 5). Hawks further noted that defendant "did appear credible in his 
presentation and seemed to be suffering from a serious mental illness" (Id.) (emphasis 
omitted). Consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(4)(a), Hawks found: 
i. [that defendant] did not appear to comprehend or to 
appreci?/ the charges or allegations against him; 
ii. [that defendant] did not demonstrate an ability [to] disclose to 
counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; 
iii. [that defendant] did not adequately comprehend or 
appreciate[] the range and nature of possible penalties; 
iv. [that defendant] did not portray the ability to engage in 
reasoned choice of legal strategies and options; 
10 
v. [that it wasj u - it defendant under stood tl le ad * - ei sai y 
nature of the dings against him; 
vi. fthatd'^^-* McK to manifest appropriate behavior; 
and 
v ii.
 Lthai defendant] might not be likely to testify relevantly. 
(R 179:Hawks' 1st Rep. at 4-5). 
"Mill,, Hawks noted that dclendunl n A m»i i nopei ili\ i ' ill Il lllne 
necessarj tests to i nak 5 a differential diagnosis" (R. 179:Hawks' 1st Rt*p at 3). 
Moreover, "in this examiner's opinion malingering (faking mentalk ill* ha> not Kvr 
sufficient1- paled ~r/" (Id ^ "* i.-.. *[i]t is this examiner's opinion a more ca . 
L-sali iliilr 1 io'fHliil In iiui :• IrVrrtrn-
\\ Kuuawi\\ mental condition" (Id.). 
" he November 20 hearing, Hawks testified that defendant appeared to have 
problems in almost all areas of competencv . t 
ii lfoi i 1 latioi 1 he recer > ed from MHIH 11 al :: ontacts, such as personnel from the 
jail, andernimed this conclusion (R. 183.31) Moreover, defendant refused to complete 
some of the testing that would have been useful for a morc dclinitn c e\ aluaiir; 
1^ 3 'I u l 1 111.ill,, al UM',1 « m< ,'M'h '.',?' Ihvks mid,. K1.1 1 IHendant 1 m]i iin/.l • 1 
kind of validity scale; thus, defendant could easily lie if he wanted to appear incompetent 
7
' *-~
;
 42, 55). Consequently, Hawks testified, he was "worr[ied] about [his] opinions" 
1 asth H.iwks rlanfml ilut luis snminaiion involved defendant's present 
competency. Additional testing and research would be necessary before Hawks could 
11 
offer an opinion as to defendant's competency at the time he entered his plea (R. 183:49, 
54). Still, Hawks noted that, if defendant knew enough to file a motion to withdraw his 
plea within thirty days of entering it, that would suggest that defendant had some 
knowledge of courtroom proceedings and that he was understanding the judge at the time 
of his plea (R. 183:39-40). In addition, if defendant wrote the withdrawal motion on his 
own, that would support a conclusion that he was more likely malingering than mentally 
ill (R. 183:58). Hawks concluded that reviewing the plea videotape would be useful in 
making that determination (R. 183:59). 
After Hawks' testimony, defense counsel asked the court to have Hawks complete 
the additional testing and review necessary to determine defendant's competency at the 
time of his plea (R. 183:61). The trial court agreed with counsel's suggestion (R. 183:63-
64). In addition, the court ordered that a third alienist be appointed (Id.). 
Dr. Hawks' second report was prepared in response to the trial court's order. 
Unlike for his first report, this time Hawks reviewed the videotape of defendant's plea 
hearing and numerous grievances defendant had filed while he was incarcerated, 
including four he wrote during the same month he entered his plea (R. 179: Hawks' 2nd 
Rep. at 3, 11; R. 184:12-13, 14, 16). In addition, Hawks interviewed defendant two more 
times and then observed him without his knowledge while he was outside his cell one day 
using the phone and communicating with other inmates or jail personnel (R. 179:Hawks' 
2nd Rep. at 3; R. 184:7, 17). Finally, Hawks interviewed numerous medical and non-
12 
medic; il iail staf f cc >nc ei n i n g d( %i V» >< 1; H »!" s c :)i idi ict o\ ei 1:1 le coi irse of his n itcai :ei ati :)i: i (R 
1 ' ! ', V/ r> -
 :: a- p 1^4-S). 
Based on these extended observations, Hawks concluded that defendant was 
competent when he entered his plea on \La, u ~c>. J*''.-, i, -^  . ^  - i .^ ?.,; .. 
I OIISI >(ciil , ilh I hull < ink \ I in i in k r I ' '»( 4II ill II n\ kr Imii il 
i. Mi Walls appeared to comprehend and appreciate the charges 
and allegations against him; 
ii. • I\ Ii Walls demonstrated an ability to disclose to counsc1 
pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; 
IV IT. Walls adequately comprehended and apprtx : 
i: ange and nature of possible penalties; 
Mr. Walls portrayed the ability to engage in reasoned choice 
of legal strategies and options; 
v. Mr. Walls understood the adversary nature of the proceedings 
against him; 
v
' Walls manifested appropriate courtroom behavior, 
necessarv *1 Walls was likely u- h^t;'\ relevant 
Hawks concluded thai ^;; March 26, 2002, [defendant] was not experiencing any 
significant mental illness or mental defect," although he "probably does have some 
underlying nil LI (t> moderate ineiilal ileie-J and oi disoidti" 11<* i '<» ll.p',1 ' "n«) l'''i|» ,il 
5) Moreover, Hawks noted that defendant's "behavior during the evaluation process 
including written tests was not consistent with behavior described by others," and that his 
"behavior-,* -, _ .; x \ , i j \ mcniu^v ^uuk, ; A.I \ . w: • .. 
obsei ved by tl lis e * - all late i " "' (1 1 179:1 lav 4s ' 2nd R ep at 10) I lawks coi ich ided that 
defendant "has been exaggerating his emotional and intellectual problems" and his 
symptoms of mental illness UJ at s. 1° !> 1 ^4 'P) 
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On January 28, 2003, Hawks provided testimony explaining his second report. As 
he had done in his report, Hawks explained that, in addition to doing additional testing on 
defendant, Hawks consulted collateral sources to determine defendant's competency on 
the day he entered his plea (R. 184:8-14). Whereas for his last report Hawks relied 
primarily on his interviews with defendant and the results of a few tests conducted on 
defendant, this time Hawks compared defendant's conduct during his interviews and 
defendant's test results with information derived from the plea video, from jail personnel, 
from his own observations of defendant outside his cell during his free time, and from the 
grievances defendant wrote while incarcerated (R. 184:8-14). The information Hawks 
obtained from these other sources—that defendant could use the telephone; could 
communicate intelligently with other inmates and jail personnel; could recall incidents 
that had or were happening; and could articulate grievances, for example—was 
dramatically different from how defendant presented himself during the interviews and 
through his tests, one of which measured his intellectual age as 5.3 years old (R. 184:8-
14, 16-19). These dramatic differences convinced Hawks that defendant was 
malingering, i.e., that he was exaggerating any mental illness he had (R. 184:13). 
The third alienist appointed was Beverly O'Connor, a clinical neuropsychologist 
(R. 184:26). As part of her evaluation, O'Connor met with defendant twice, and reviewed 
the first report Dr. Hawks had prepared, as well as Mr. Potter's report (R. 
179:0'Connor's Rep. at 1-2). O'Connor noted in her report that, during her interviews, 
defendant's "speech was often poorly articulated," and she "frequently had to have him 
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icpea1 himself because he w »r mMlfffimi!'" ' i l n ^ m , ] ",' >' it 2-3). In addition, 
defendant "appeared to have some difficulty comprehending the interview questions 
accurately at times" (Id.). Further, defendant reported both/that he heard voices that upset' 
him, som.eti.mes and """also reported soi i i,e " • isi lal 1: lallucinatioi is""" ' ( "' i / .) I :inallj - O'C :)i n i : i 
in itt/t 1 llul I nil t test ili/su'iinl lii measure defendant's overall level of intellectual 
functioning, defendant showed "severe problem^ .*- m v er -al intellectual abilities" and 
"some difficulty with complex, attention, and ^oncentratk-. •.»« :. A 
liascd mi llliin ulm,i!\ alum. <H mn - - JI iffered from 
either a delusional disorder or a schizophrenic disorder thai 'likely causes him to have an 
' have a rational or ut-AnJ understanding of the proceedings against him or of 
the punishment ^ p e i n . . . tor tne oiienst . ., . 
111.if ilrfendanC - ' - v - -mpairments result in an 
inability to consult Willi ins counsel or participate n. he proceedings against him with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding," let alone "engage in any fully reasoned 
to appreciate and comprehend the full nature of the charge against him," and "it is 
questionable if he wil1 m .:' V to disclose to his counsel pertinent facts, events, and states 
of mind during the inciGi-n: * ,:,.*. .. •,.. icd iiui ilit" t. IitiiJJ,CS"' (/</ ai "mi Hased mi liri 
obsei \ " ati ::n is, O'Coi n 101 conch ided that defendant "was most like!" Filncompetent at the 
time he both entered his plea and withdrew his plea
 v \. O'Connor also noted that 
"the possibility of malingering cannot be totally ruled out" •: l4* i lowever, she suspected 
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defendant did not have "enough . . . intellectual ability or psychological sophistication to 
malinger in an effective or convincing manner" (Id.). 
O'Connor's testimony at the January 28 hearing was much more equivocal on 
defendant's competency than was her report. Agreeing that her report indicated 
defendant might be malingering, O'Connor offered that she "ha[s] a lot of questions about 
this defendant" (R. 184:27). 
She also testified that, although she had not read Dr. Hawk's second report prior to 
doing her evaluation, what he had done there—talking with other people to find out what 
defendant was like in his day-to-day living—was a good idea (R. 184:28-29). She also 
would have found it useful to review the grievances defendant had written and to watch 
defendant during his free periods, as Dr. Hawks had done (R. 184:29-30). 
O'Connor explained that she was not aware defendant had written any grievances 
and did not know she could request to observe defendant outside of her interviews (R. 
184:29-30); however, where her concern was that defendant had a probable mental 
illness, a low verbal IQ, and verbal comprehension difficulties, that information would 
have helped her more accurately determine defendant's verbal skills as well as whether 
defendant was faking his condition (R. 184:30-31, 35-36). O'Connor acknowledged that, 
although her opinion was that defendant was not faking anything while he took the tests, 
it was possible that he was distorting his problems (R. 184:33-34). 
O'Connor concluded her testimony by stating, "I did have concerns [regarding 
whether defendant was faking things] and that's why I recommended that he be put 
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somewhere where he can be observed more closely . . . — and that's basically some of 
what Dr. Hawks did. He had a chance to set up some kind of a way to where he could 
observe [defendant] . . . [w]ithout him knowing" (R. 184:37). 
After the January 28th hearing, the trial court ruled: 
After reviewing everything and after listening to everything, 
I've come to the conclusion that, in fact, Mr. Walls was competent to 
enter his plea, that he did knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea. 
If in fact he had been at the level of a five year old, I do not 
believe—in my—my assessment and given my experience, hav[ing] 
taken hundreds of these pleas, I think I would have at least been able 
to assess whether he was functioning at that low level of intellect. 
That strikes me as being very significant. 
. . . In fact, I believe one portion of the plea Mr. Gravis 
volunteered information that he'd been talking with him and that Mr. 
Walls had been asking appropriate questions and that he assessed 
him to be fine. And that was voluntary on his part just simply 
because I guess Mr. Walls started making some comments during the 
plea, which I believe I followed up on and which he followed up on 
himself and responded to. 
So I don't know that the fact that this wasn't noticed earlier is 
anything other than it wasn't there to be noticed probably, as much 
as anything.. . . 
And I'm also relying on Dr. Hawks' follow-up information of 
getting some information from collateral sources who are in a 
position to actually see his behavior on an ongoing basis. And what 
I'm seeing here are just a lot of inconsistencies in the way he 
presents himself. . . . 
But the most telling thing is what he's like when he doesn't 
think anybody is watching or analyzing him. And that is when the 
jailers are able to observe his behavior and use of the phone, his 
complaints, his cognitive processing in even being able to complain 
or assess-you know, telling them what the situation is that he's 
complaining about. All those things add up to me to be 
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inconsistency to the point of preponderating toward malingering in 
this case. 
And I don't come to this conclusion lightly because, frankly, 
I—I'm like any one of you here that if someone is not able to enter a 
plea or has done it incompetently then there are other mechanisms 
that we have to— have to exhaust to either get them to the point 
where they can be competent or — or otherwise review it. But I 
don't think that's the situation here. 
And so for all those reasons I'm going to find that the plea 
was competent, was knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
(R. 184:51-53). 
The trial court did not enter a formal order denying defendant's motion. Instead, 
the trial court proceeded to sentence defendant to serve five-years-to-life in prison and to 
pay restitution for his crime (R. 162-63; R. 184:57-58). 
Defendant timely appealed from that final judgment (R. 165). The supreme court 
subsequently transferred the matter to this Court for disposition. See April 14, 2003 
Order. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Defendant raises two claims that the trial court erred under rule 11 in 
finding that his plea was voluntary. However, neither of these claims were raised below. 
Although this Court has previously held that such claims can be reached under the plain 
error doctrine, this Court should overrule that precedent as lacking analytical support and 
contrary to the plain language of the plea statute. It should then reject defendant's claims 
as not properly before this Court. 
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Alternatively, this Court should reject defendant's claims as invited error where 
defendant repeatedly told the lower court during discussions on his motion to withdraw 
that the court's "rule 11 colloquy was done adequately and, in fact, even more than . . . 
adequately." 
Finally, defendant's claims fail on their merits. First, the evidence before the trial 
court at the time of defendant's plea did not indicate any competency issue. Thus, the 
trial court did not plainly err in accepting defendant's plea without ordering a competency 
proceeding. Second, at the plea hearing, defendant affirmatively indicated his 
understanding that a letter from the State concerning defendant's sentence was not 
binding on the parole board. Because defendant was aware of the value of the State's 
promise to send the letter, the trial court did not plainly err in accepting defendant's plea 
based on that promise. 
Issue II. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea because there is "doubt as to the Defendant's mental state" at the 
time he entered his plea. However, defendant fails to marshal the evidence supporting the 
trial court's malingering finding. Thus, defendant's claim fails. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS 
THAT HIS PLEA WAS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF RULE 11 
WHERE DEFENDANT DID NOT RAISE THOSE CLAIMS IN HIS 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea because his plea was not voluntary under Rule 11. Aplt. Br. at 17, 23. 
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Defendant claims first that his plea was not voluntary under rule 11 because he was not 
competent at the time he entered it. Aplt. Br. at 17. He claims second that his plea was 
not voluntary under rule 11 because the State's promise to write a letter to the Board of 
Pardons had minimal value, and the trial court "did not make an adequate record to ensure 
that the Defendant did in fact understand the nature and value of any promises made to 
him." Aplt. Br. at 23 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
This Court should reject defendant's rule 11 claims as not properly before this 
Court. Alternatively, this Court should reject these claims as invited errors. 
A. Defendant's rule 11 claims are not properly before this Court. 
This Court has previously held that it can consider challenges to a plea hearing 
raised for the first time on appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw under the plain 
error doctrine. See pp. 22-26 infra. Because that holding lacks analytical support and is 
inconsistent with the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (the plea statute), this 
Court should overrule it. After doing so, this Court should reject defendant's rule 11 
claims, raised for the first time on appeal, as not properly before this Court. 
Importantly, in making the argument set forth below, the State does not argue that 
a defendant can never raise a plain error claim on appeal from the denial of a motion to 
withdraw. Rather, the State argues only that such plain error claim must relate to the 
conduct of the motion court in addressing the claims raised in the defendant's 
motion—such as when the motion court proceeds with a pro se defendant without 
inquiring as to whether the defendant has waived his right to an attorney. The plain error 
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doctrine cannot be manipulated by a defendant to raise new challenges to the trial court's 
conduct at the plea hearing where, under the plea statute, defendant was required to raise 
those claims before the motion court. 
1. Stare decisis. 
The doctrine of stare decisis, "'under which the first decision by a court on a 
particular question of law governs later decisions by the same court, is a cornerstone of 
Anglo-American jurisprudence that is crucial to the predictability of the law and the 
fairness of adjudication.'" State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (quoting State 
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993)). The doctrine therefore imposes strict 
requirements on courts to follow the dictates of previously established law. See id. at 399 
& n.3. However, "the doctrine is neither mechanical nor rigid as it relates to courts of last 
resort." Id. at 399. 
"Those asking [this Court] to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of 
persuasion." Id. at 398; see also Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, f 12 n.3, 40 P.3d 
632. They can succeed only if this Court becomes "'clearly convinced that the rule was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more 
good than harm will come by departing from precedent.'" Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 
(quoting John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill.L.Rev. 367, 367 
(1957)); see also Wheeler, 2002 UT 16, f 12 n.3; City ofHildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, ^ 
36,28P.3d697. 
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Still, "'[w]hen precedent and precedent alone is all the argument that can be made 
to support a court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to destroy it.'" Menzies, 
889 P.2d at 399 (quoting Francis v. Southern Pac. R.R., 333 U.S. 445, 471 (1948) (Black, 
J., dissenting)). Similarly, the "'[sjtare decisis effect of [a] case is substantially 
diminished by the fact that the legal point therein was decided without argument.'" Id. 
(quoting 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 193 (1965)). 
This Court's decisions reaching claims raised for the first time on appeal from the 
denial of a motion to withdraw lack analytical support. Moreover, they are inconsistent 
with the plain language of the plea statute. Consequently, this Court should overrule 
those decisions. 
2. The lack of analytical support for this Court's precedent 
allowing appellate courts to reach new claims raised for 
the first time on appeal from the denial of a motion to 
withdraw a plea detracts from its stare decisis force. 
The State has found no Utah Supreme Court case considering a claim raised for the 
first time on appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. 
Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 319 (Utah 1998), did hold that an appellate court could reach a 
claim challenging a plea "for the first time on appeal if plain error or exceptional 
circumstances exist" where defendant had not filed a motion to withdraw. However, at 
the time, the statute governing motions to withdraw pleas contained no time limit for 
filing them. Thus, the supreme court could have easily determined that any decision by it 
not to reach the issue on appeal would merely mean that the issue would reappear after 
defendant raised the issue in a subsequent motion to withdraw. That interpretation is 
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consistent with the supreme court's recent discussion of Marvin, in which the court held 
that Marvin no longer applies now that the plea statute limits the time for filing motions 
to thirty days. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, If 4, 40 P.3d 630. 
Nonetheless, this Court has previously reached such plain error issues, even when 
defendant's claims do not attack the motion proceeding but instead attempt to smuggle in 
previously unclaimed errors in the plea hearing. See, e.g. State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 
323, ffl[ 8-9, 57 P.3d 1106 (rejecting State's argument that issues on appeal from denial of 
motion to withdraw should be limited to issues raised below), cert, granted, 64 P.3d 586 
(Utah 2003); State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ^  5, 47 P.3d 101 (reaching claim for first 
time on appeal where timely motion to withdraw filed below), cert, granted, 59 P.3d 603 
(Utah 2002); State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, K 11, 5 P.3d 1222 (reaching rule 11 
claim for first time on appeal even though untimely motion to withdraw deprived trial 
court of jurisdiction), overruled by State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, % 4, 40 P.3d 630 (holding 
appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider plain error challenge to plea where no 
timely motion to withdraw filed); State v. Ostler (Ostler I), 2000 UT App 28, ^  8, 996 
P.2d 1065 (reaching rule 11 claim for first time on appeal even though untimely motion to 
withdraw deprived trial court of jurisdiction), affirmed on other grounds by State v. Ostler 
(Ostler II), 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528 (affirming based on conclusion that motion to 
withdraw was timely filed in trial court; not reaching propriety of court of appeals' plain 
error decision); State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah App. 1990) (reaching 
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unpreserved claim for plain error where defendant filed a timely motion to withdraw); 
State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah App. 1989) (per curiam) (same). 
However, the analytical bases in these cases for reaching such unpreserved claims 
is not strong. For example, in Valencia, this Court decided to reach the plain error issue 
with no analysis of the propriety of that action except a citation to Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). See Valencia, 116 P.2d at 1334 ("'It was error, plain on the 
face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an 
affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.'") (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 
242). 
Boykin, however, was a direct appeal in a capital murder case in which the 
reviewing court was mandated by statute "to comb the record for any error prejudicial to 
the appellant, even though not called to [the court's] attention in brief of counsel." 
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 241 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. 
Honie, 2002 UT 4, ^ 67, 57 P.3d 977 (holding that because of special nature of death 
penalty, court can reach issue on appeal not raised below or briefed by parties; however, 
court's authority does not abrogate defendant's burden to preserve and brief issues), cert, 
denied, 537 U.S. 863 (2002); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 552-53 (Utah 1987). 
Because no such statute or case law exists in appeals from motions to withdraw, 
Boykin provides no support for the Valencia court's decision to apply the plain error 
doctrine to claims that were not raised before the trial court in a timely motion to 
withdraw. 
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Pharris then relied on Valencia and State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 
1987). See Pharris, 798 P.2d at 774. Valencia, as previously discussed, provides only 
weak support for that holding. Gibbons provides none. In Gibbons, the defendant had 
not filed a motion to withdraw his plea, and thus had not raised his claims below, but 
instead apparently challenged his plea on direct appeal from his conviction. See Gibbons, 
740 P.2d at 1311. The State argued that the court should not reach the defendant's 
unpreserved claims even under the plain error doctrine. See id. The court in fact 
accepted the State's position. See id. Instead of reaching the defendant's claims, the 
supreme court noted that the plea statute then in effect "sets no time limit for filing a 
motion to withdraw the plea" and then remanded the matter to the trial court "to enable 
defendant to file a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas." Id. The Gibbons court noted: 
"This disposition is . . . consonant with the policy of allowing trial judges to have the 
opportunity to address an alleged error." Id. at 1312. 
In Ostler I, this Court relied on Marvin, 964 P.2d at 318, and State v. Price, 837 
P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App. 1992), to hold that it had jurisdiction to consider a plain error 
claim on appeal even absent a timely motion to withdraw. See Ostler, 996 P.2d at 1068. 
As already discussed, the supreme court has since held that Marvin was decided when the 
plea statute contained no time limitation for filing motions to withdraw and that Marvin 
no longer applies now that the plea statute limits the time for filing motions to withdraw 
to thirty days. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, U 4, 40 P.3d 630. Although Price 
discussed a claim raised for the first time on appeal, it later decided that discussion was 
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unnecessary because defendant's motion to withdraw was not filed within the statutory 
time limit. See Price, 837 P.2d at 583-84. Finally, the plain error part of Ostler was 
overruled in Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f^ 4, which held that an appellate court cannot use plain 
error to reach a claim over which the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to the failure to 
file a timely motion to withdraw. 
Because Tarnawiecki relied solely on Ostler I, Tarnawiecki provides no greater 
insight as to the propriety of using plain error to reach a claim raised for the first time on 
appeal in this context. See Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, ^ f 11. Nor does Hittle, which 
cited Tarnawiecki and then unrelated general case law defining plain error. See Hittle, 
2002 UT App 134, f 5. 
Finally, Dean did not cite to any of this case law to justify its decision to reach a 
plain error claim. Rather, Dean reached the defendant's plain error claim merely by 
concluding that because Reyes—which held that an appellate court cannot reach a plain 
error claim when a defendant has not filed a timely motion to withdraw—is 
distinguishable, it "does not preclude this court from reviewing [the defendant's] plain 
error argument." Dean, 2002 UT App 323, ^ 9. 
Thus, although this Court has repeatedly reached challenges to the plea taking that 
are raised for the first time on appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw, neither this 
Court nor the supreme court has ever seriously analyzed the propriety of that result, 
particularly in light of the plain language of the plea statute and case law interpreting it. 
Consequently, the stare decisis value of this precedent is, at best, weak. Cf. Menzies, 889 
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P.2d at 399 (noting "4[s]tare decisis effect of [a] case is substantially diminished by the 
fact that the legal point therein was decided without argument'") (citation omitted); id. 
(noting '"[w]hen precedent and precedent alone is all the argument that can be made to 
support a court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to destroy it'") (citation 
omitted). An analysis of the plea statute and case law addressing its purposes 
demonstrates that such precedent is in fact clearly erroneous and should be overruled. 
See id. 
3. Precedent allowing appellate courts to reach claims raised 
for the first time on appeal from the denial of a motion to 
withdraw a plea is inconsistent with the plain language of 
the plea statute; thus, this Court should reject it. 
This Court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ^  25, 4 P.3d 795; see also Brixen & 
Christopher Architects, P.C. v. State, 2001 UT App 210, ^  14, 29 P.3d 650. In doing so, 
this Court "assume[s] that 'each term in a statute was used advisedly.'" Stephens v. 
Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). In addition, 
"statutory term[s] should be interpreted and applied according to [their] usually accepted 
meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term[s] results in an application that is 
neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express 
purpose of the statute." State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, f 9, 36 P.3d 533 (citations 
omitted). 
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Utah's plea statute provides: 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to 
conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon 
good cause shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made 
by motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the 
plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person 
under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(1999).3 
Under the plain language of this statute, a defendant may challenge his guilty or no 
contest plea in two ways: either as part of his criminal case by filing a motion to 
withdraw, or as a collateral challenge by filing a petition for post-conviction relief. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2), (3) (1999). 
If the challenge is made collaterally, the breadth of the challenge is defined by the 
rules applicable to post-conviction petitions. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(3). 
If the challenge is made as part of the criminal case, the challenge "must be in the 
context of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the denial of which can be appealed." 
Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah App. 1988). That context is defined by 
section 77-13-6(2). 
3Section 77-13-6 was substantially amended effective May 5, 2003. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (Supp. 2003). However, the substantive changes in the amended 
statute do not alter the analysis that follows. 
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As set forth above, section 77-13-6(2)(a) provides that "[a] plea of guilty or no 
contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of the court." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a). Section 77-13-6(2)(b) then provides that a request to 
withdraw a plea "is made by motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of 
the plea." Id. § 77-13-6(2)(b). 
Read together, the plain language of these provisions establishes three principles 
applicable to challenges to pleas made "in the context of a motion to withdraw." 
Summers, 759 P.2d at 344. 
First, defendant must begin the process by filing a motion in the trial court within 
thirty days of his plea. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b); see also Reyes, 2002 UT 13, 
U 3; Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995; Price, 837 P.2d at 583. 
Second, defendant's motion must show to the trial court that good cause exists for 
his plea to be withdrawn. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a); see also State v. 
Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah App. 1994) ( holding plea statute imposes upon 
defendant a "burden to show good cause" before a trial court must consider withdrawal of 
his plea); State v. Mildenhall, 1M P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987) ("Defendant has failed to 
show good cause why the [trial] court should have exercised its discretion to allow 
withdrawal of the plea."). 
Finally, "withdrawal of a guilty plea is a privilege, not a right, that is left to the 
trial court 's sound discretion," Brocksmith, 888 P.2d at 704 (emphasis added); see also 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a); Mildenhall 747 P.2d at 424; State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 
1040, 1041 (Utah 1987). 
Each of these requirements is consistent with the well-established principle that 
appellate courts "will not interfere with a trial judge's determination that a defendant has 
failed to show good cause unless it clearly appears that the trial judge abused his 
discretion." State v. Mildenhall 141 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987). 
Nothing in the plain language of the plea statute allows a defendant to forego filing 
a motion in the trial court and instead first challenge his plea on appeal. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b); see also Reyes, 2002 UT 13, U 3; Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995; Price, 
837P.2dat583. 
Similarly, nothing in the plain language of the plea statute allows a defendant to 
file a motion in the trial court, have that motion denied because it did not demonstrate 
good cause, and then use that denial as a means to raise new claims on appeal that were 
never presented to the court below. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a); Brocksmith, 
888 P.2d at 704 (Utah App. 1994). In fact, such result is anathema to the plain language 
of the statute. 
As this Court recognized in Summers, the purpose of requiring a defendant to first 
move in the trial court is to "giv[e] the court who took the plea the first chance to consider 
defendant's arguments." Summers, 759 P.2d at 342; see also Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312 
(holding, under statute allowing filing of motion at any time, that remand to trial court to 
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consider claim raised for first time on appeal was proper as "consonant with the policy of 
allowing trial judges to have the opportunity to address an alleged error"). 
That purpose is destroyed if a defendant may raise new challenges to his plea for 
the first time on appeal. Indeed, by allowing a defendant to forgo presenting claims to the 
trial court and nonetheless have them heard on appeal, this Court has done nothing less 
than rewritten the plea statute both to relieve the defendant of his statutory duty to show 
good cause in his trial court motion since he can raise new claims on appeal, and to 
impose upon trial courts a sua sponte duty to conduct a plenary review of the 
circumstances of defendant's plea or risk being overturned on bases never presented to it. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a). Neither of these results is consistent with the 
statute's plain language. See id. 
Consequently, for the same reason appellate courts cannot consider a claim raised 
for the first time on appeal where a defendant has not filed a timely motion to withdraw, 
see Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ^ 3; Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995; Price, 837 P.2d at 583, appellate 
courts should not reach a claim raised for the first time on appeal where a defendant has 
filed a timely motion to withdraw. In both cases, defendant has failed to bring his claim 
before the trial court in the manner prescribed by statute. In both cases, defendant should 
be precluded from having that claim addressed for the first time on appeal. 
Because this Court's precedent holding that it can reach a claim for the first time 
on appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw is not well-supported analytically, and 
because that precedent is inconsistent with the plea statute, this Court should overrule it. 
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Instead, this Court should hold, consistent with the plea statute, that only claims raised 
before the trial court in a timely motion to withdraw will be considered on appeal from 
denial of that motion. 
4. Under a proper interpretation of the plea statute, 
defendant's rule 11 claims, raised for the first time on 
appeal, are not properly before this Court. 
Defendant in this case filed a motion to withdraw. That motion, however, did not 
include either of the rule 11 claims now raised on appeal. Consequently, this Court 
should reject those claims as not properly before this Court. 
B. Even if this Court concludes defendant's rule 11 claims are 
properly before this Court, this Court should reject them as 
invited error. 
Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred in finding his 
plea voluntary under rule 11 because "[defendant was suffering from a significant mental 
illness, and was not taking his prescribed medication at the time the plea was taken." 
Aplt. Br. at 17. Defendant also claims for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred 
in finding his plea voluntary under rule 11 because the court "did not make an adequate 
record to ensure that the [defendant did in fact understand the nature and value of any 
promises made to him." Aplt. Br. at 23 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 
Even if these claims are properly before this Court, they should be rejected as invited 
errors. 
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Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that "[t]he court. . . may not 
accept [a guilty] plea until the court has found . . . the plea is voluntarily made." Utah R. 
Crim.P. 11(e)(2). 
The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
record before an appellate court will review such claim[s] on appeal."' State v. Johnson, 
114 P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987)); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, U 11, 10 P.3d 346. This preservation rule 
"applies to every claim . . . unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional 
circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f^ 11. 
Moreover, if defendant led the trial court into the error he now claims on appeal, his claim 
will not be reached by this Court even for plain error but, instead, will be rejected as 
invited error. See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (holding that, "'[i]f a 
party through counsel.. . has led the trial court into error, [this Court] will then decline to 
save that party from the error'") (quoting State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 
1989)) (emphasis omitted); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant made no claim in his motion to withdraw before the trial court that the 
court had erred under rule 11 in finding that he was entering his plea voluntarily (R. 
181:13; R. 183:10; R. 184:45-48). To the contrary, defendant repeatedly told the trial 
court that its colloquy at the plea hearing satisfied the requirements of rule 11 and that he 
found no error during the plea proceedings (R. 183:10; R. 184:45-48). Under such 
33 
circumstances, defendant invited any error in the trial court's failure to find a rule 11 error 
in those proceedings. 
Consequently, defendant's claims fail. 
C. Even if this Court reaches defendant's rule 11 claims, they fail 
on their merits. 
As discussed above, defendant claims that the trial court erred in finding his plea 
voluntary under rule 11 because "[defendant was suffering from a significant mental 
illness, and was not taking his prescribed medication at the time the plea was taken." 
Aplt. Br. at 17. Alternatively, defendant claims that the trial court erred in finding his 
plea voluntary under rule 11 because the court "did not make an adequate record to 
ensure that the [djefendant did in fact understand the nature and value of any promises 
made to him." Aplt. Br. at 23 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Neither 
of defendant's claims has merit. 
Because defendant did not raise either of these claims below, neither succeeds 
unless defendant can establish plain error. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^  11, 10 P.3d 
346; State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 
566, 570 (Utah App. 1994). To show plain error, defendant must demonstrate (1) that an 
error occurred; (2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) that 
the error was prejudicial. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that "[t]he court. . . may not 
accept [a guilty] plea until the court has found . . . the plea is voluntarily made." Utah R. 
Cnm. P. 11(e)(2). 
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1. Defendant's competency claim fails where the evidence 
before the trial court at the time of the defendant's plea 
did not indicate any competency issue. 
Rule 11 only addresses the trial court's duties prior to accepting a plea. See Utah 
R. Crim. P. 11(e) (identifying what trial court must find prior to accepting plea). Thus, 
defendant's claim must be that the trial court erred in not finding defendant incompetent 
at the time he entered his plea. 
However, absent a competency petition, "'[a] trial court must hold a competency 
hearing [only] when there is "a substantial question of possible doubt as to a defendant's 
competency at the time of the guilty plea.'"" State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, \ 49, 63 P.3d 
731 (quoting Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, % 13, 20 P.3d 382 (quoting State v. Holland, 
921 P.2d 430, 435 (Utah 1996))). Moreover, in reviewing whether a trial court erred in 
not holding such a hearing, this Court "'considers] only those facts that were before the 
[trial] court when the plea was entered.'" Jacobs, 2001 UT 17, f 18 (quoting York v. 
Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 595 (Utah App. 1994)) (second alteration in original); see also 
Argiielles,2m\li: 1,1|50. 
Here, the only evidence before the trial court at the time of defendant's plea even 
hinting that defendant might have a mental problem was that he had been prescribed two 
medications while at the jail and that he was not taking either of them (R. 186:9). 
However, when asked by the court why the medication had been prescribed, defendant 
never mentioned a possible mental illness (R. 186:10). Instead, he merely replied that he 
could not remember (R. 186:10). 
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All the remaining evidence before the trial court at the time of defendant's plea 
overwhelmingly indicated defendant's competency. Defendant responded appropriately 
to every question asked by the court (R. 186:2-13, 15). On multiple occasions, defendant 
expressly told the court that he understood what he was pleading to, the sentence which 
applied to his crime, and the rights he was giving up as a result of his plea (R. 186:2-8, 
10). In addition, once, after nodding to the judge in response to a question and being told 
that he had to respond aloud, defendant followed the court's direction, verbalizing his 
answer (R. 186:2-3). Finally, when the issue turned to the medication defendant had been 
prescribed, defense counsel interjected that he had "talked to Mr. Walls extensively twice 
over the last couple of weeks and he has shown that he has understood what we've talked 
about and we've engaged in reasonable discussions. He's understood and asked relevant 
questions" (R. 186:10). 
In light of this evidence, there was no "substantial question of possible doubt as to 
. . . defendant's competency at the time of [his] guilty plea." Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^  49. 
Consequently, the trial court did not err under rule 11 in accepting defendant's plea 
without first ordering further evaluations on his competency. See id. 
2. Defendant's illusory promise claim fails where defendant 
indicated he understood that the State's promise to send a 
letter to the parole board might have no impact on the 
parole board's sentencing determination. 
Before accepting a plea, the trial court has a duty to ensure that the defendant 
"understand[s] the nature and value of any promises made to him.'" State v. Copeland, 
765 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305,1 11, 57 
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P.3d 238 (reversing denial of motion to withdraw plea where trial court's "legal error 
exaggerated the benefits [defendant] would receive from pleading guilty"). The record 
here establishes that the trial court fulfilled that duty. 
When the trial court learned that defendant had agreed to plead guilty in return for 
the State's promise to send a letter to the parole board requesting that defendant serve 
only between ten and twelve years of the statutory five-years-to-life prison term (R. 
186:2), the trial court informed defendant that the charge to which he was pleading 
carried an indeterminate sentence of five years to life in prison (R. 186:7). The court then 
specifically told defendant: "You should also be aware that just because the State writes 
a letter to the parole authority doesn't mean they have to follow their recommendation" 
(R. 186:7). Defendant replied, "Yeah, I've been told that" (R. 186:7). The court then 
stated, "So you shouldn't rely on anything that the State has indicated they may or may 
not do in entering this sentence because you could serve a lot longer than what they're 
going to recommend" (R. 186:7-8). Defendant responded, "Yeah, I know" (R. 186:8). 
This dialogue establishes that defendant understood both the nature and value of 
the State's promise. Thus, contrary to defendant's contention, the trial court "did . . . 
make an adequate record to ensure that the Defendant did in fact 'understand the nature 
and value of any promises made to him.'" Aplt. Br. at 23 (citation omitted). That the 
prosecutor's letter was not binding on the parole board does not render the State's 
promise illusory. Cf. State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1302 (Utah App. 1989) ("Where 
[the] defendant is aware that there is no guarantee the court will agree to follow the 
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prosecutor's recommendation, there is no reason to set aside a guilty plea if the court did 
not follow the prosecutor's recommendation, even if the defendant is disappointed with 
the severity of the sentence."). 
Consequently defendant's claim fails. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM THAT HE WAS INCOMPETENT TO 
PLEAD GUILTY WHERE DEFENDANT FAILS TO MARSHAL 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
MALINGERING FINDING 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. See Aplt. Br. at 17. According to defendant, "[ajlthough [two 
of the examining alienists] believed that the Defendant was malingering, and [the third] 
conceded that the Defendant might be malingering, there is sufficient doubt as to the 
Defendant's mental state at the time of the guilty pleas to require the trial court to allow 
the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea." Aplt. Br. at 18. This Court should reject 
defendant's claim because he has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial 
court's competency ruling. 
"It is well established that due process requires that a defendant be mentally 
competent to plead guilty and to stand trial." State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^  47, 63 P.3d 
731; see also Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, ^ 12, 20 P.3d 382. '"[I]n determining whether 
a defendant is competent to plead guilty, the trial court must consider whether the 
defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
38 
proceedings against him.'" Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, <[ 48 (quoting State v. Holland, 921 
P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (1999) (defining when 
defendant is "incompetent to proceed"). 
'The determination of whether a defendant is competent to proceed . . . is a mixed 
question of fact and law." State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Utah 1997). 
However, "[t]he trial court's factual findings in support of its determination of 
malingering and its accompanying credibility determinations are subject to a clearly 
erroneous standard of review." Id.\ State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, \ 45, 20 P.3d 342. 
Consequently, where, as here, defendant is essentially challenging the trial court's 
malingering finding, he "bears the burden of marshaling all the evidence in favor of the 
factual finding that he was malingering and then demonstrating that, even viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the court below, that evidence is insufficient to 
support the court's finding." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1223-24; see also Arguelles, 2003 
UT 1,fflf 67, 68; Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ^ 45. 
In this case, the only evidence defendant marshals in support of the trial court's 
malingering finding is that "Dr. Hawks, as well as Mr. Potter believed that the Defendant 
was malingering (R. 183/23), and Dr. O'Connor conceded that the Defendant might be 
malingering (R. 184/27, 33)." Aplt. Br. at 18. Although this evidence alone is sufficient 
to support the trial court's malingering finding, defendant's marshaling falls far short of 
presenting to this Court all the evidence underlying the alienists' conclusions that further 
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support that finding. For example, defendant fails to marshal the following supporting 
evidence: 
1. That, during the plea hearing, defendant responded 
appropriately to all questions asked by the trial court, spoke 
coherently, and indicated he understood everything that was 
happening (R. 186:2-13, 15). 
2. That, during the same month in which defendant entered his 
plea, defendant filed four grievances with the jail which 
showed an ability to recall incidents and articulate 
dissatisfaction in a manner inconsistent with incompetency 
(R. 179:Hawks' 2nd Rep. at 4, 11; R. 184:8-14, 16-19). 
3. That, according to Rhett Potter, defendant's "[r]ecent and 
remote memory were intact" and defendant's "letters to the 
Court and to his defense attorney show a good grasp of the 
charges, the judicial process, and alternative defenses" (R. 
179: Potter's Rep. at 2). 
4. That, according to Mr. Potter, defendant's claim of hearing 
voices was inconsistent with schizophrenia and "seem[ed] to 
be a convenient explanation/excuse for [defendant's] 
behavior," "a manipulative device" used by defendant (R. 
179:Potter'sRep. at2;R. 183:20). 
5. That, according to Mr. Potter, if defendant was truly suffering 
from schizophrenia at the time of his plea to the extent he 
required medication, and, as was the case here, defendant was 
not taking his medication at that time, the judge would "have 
some question about whether or not this person was actually 
able to make that plea or not" (R. 183:28). 
6. That Dr. Hawks' initial evaluation of defendant as 
incompetent was based almost exclusively on defendant's 
performance on certain tests, at least one of which contained 
no internal validity scale (R. 183:30, 42, 55). Moreover, 
because defendant refused to complete additional testing that 
would have allowed for a more definitive evaluation and 
because the results of defendant's tests did not conform to 
information Dr. Hawks received from collateral contacts at 
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the jail, Dr. Hawks was "worrfied] about [the accuracy of his 
initial] opinions" (R. 183:31-33, 34). 
7. That, after evaluating defendant further, Dr. Hawks concluded 
that, although defendant's "behavior on the IQ test" suggested 
he was "[s]everely mentally retarded" with an intellectual age 
of 5.3 years old, those results were "not consistent with 
behavior described by others" who observed defendant at the 
prison, or with Dr. Hawks' own observations of 
defendant—when defendant didn't know it—which showed 
an ability to interaction, communicate, and function that 
indicated defendant "was not experiencing any significant 
mental illness or mental defect" (R. 179:Hawks' 2nd Rept. at 
3,4,5,7, 10; R. 184:8-14,16-19). 
8. That, according to Dr. Hawks, defendant "has been 
exaggerating his emotional and intellectual problems," and 
was in fact malingering (R. 179:Hawks' 2nd Rep. at 5, 10; R. 
184:13). 
9. That, although Ms. O'Connor's report indicated a conclusion 
that defendant was not competent when he entered his plea, 
her report also noted that "the possibility of malingering 
cannot be totally ruled out" and that further observation of 
defendant was recommended (R. 179:0'Connor's Rep. at 9; 
R. 184:37). 
10. That Ms. O'Connor testified that she reached her conclusions 
after meeting with defendant twice and reviewing Mr. Potter's 
report and Dr. Hawks' initial report, and that further 
observations of defendant and his writings—like those 
conducted by Dr. Hawks—would have helped her more 
accurately determine whether defendant was faking his 
condition (R. 184:29-31, 35, 37). 
All this evidence supports the trial court's finding that defendant was malingering. 
See, e.g., Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ffi[ 48-50 (holding that trial court could properly give less 
credence to alienists who questioned defendant's competency where their underlying 
analysis was weaker than other alienists and where court could also draw on its own prior 
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observations of defendant); Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1224 (holding "record reveals ample 
evidence supporting the trial court's determination of malingering" where, although some 
alienists based their incompetency determinations on defendant's "inability to express or 
understand verbal communications," "[t]he record is replete with evidence of faking on 
this point"). 
Because defendant does not marshal any of this evidence, let alone explain why 
this evidence is insufficient to support the findings underlying the trial court's 
competency ruling, defendant's challenge to that ruling fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's conviction 
and sentence. 
</ RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED J^j_ October 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK' 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
77-13-4 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
( D A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
419 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 11 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
le) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(exl) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
ingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
ie)'4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
< e n 4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion 
to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English 
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to 
the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence 
is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and 
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; Novem-
ber 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — These 
amendments are intended to reflect current law 
without any substantive changes The addition 
of a requirement for a finding of a factual basis 
in section ie l< 4K B) tracks federal rule 11(f), and 
is in accordance with prior case law Eg State 
i Breckenndge, 688 P2d 440 (Utah 1983) The 
rule now explicitly recognizes pleas under 
Sorth Carolina i Alford, 400 U S 25, 91 S Ct 
160 27 L Ed 2d 162 * 1970), and sets forth the 
factual basis required for those pleas Eg 
WWett L Barnes, 842 P2d 860 (Utah 1992) 
The amendments explicitly recognize that 
plea affidavits, where used, may properly be 
incorporated into the record when the trial 
The final paragraph of section <e) clarifies 
that the trial court may, but need not, advise 
defendants concerning collateral consequences 
of a guilt\ plea The failure to so advise does not 
affect the \ alidity of a plea State v McFadden, 
884 P2d 1303 'Utah App 1994). cert denied, 
892 P2d 13 'Utah 1995) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend-
ment substituted "sworn statement" for "affida-
\ i t ' three times in the paragraph following 
Subdivision <e>«8> 
court determines that the defendant has read 
(or been read) the affidavit, understands its 
contents, and acknowledges the contents State 
v Maguire, 830 P2d 216 (Utah 1991) Proper 
incorporation of plea affidavits can save the 
court time, eliminate some of the monotony of 
rote recitations of rights waived by pleading 
guilty, and allow a more focused and probing 
inquiry into the facts of the offense, the rela-
tionship of the law to those facts, and whether 
the plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered 
These benefits are contingent on a careful and 
considered review of the affidavit by the defen-
dant and proper care by the trial court to verify 
that such a review has actually occurred 
The 2002 amendment substituted "written 
statement" for "sworn statement" and twice 
deleted "sworn" before "statement" in the sec-
ond-to-last paragraph in Subdivision (e) 
Cross-References. — Inadmissibility of 
pleas, plea discussions or related statements. 
U R E 410 
Time limit for filing motion to withdraw plea 
of guilty or no contest, § 77-13-6 
